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1. Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2007). The statute,
as amended in 1998, reads in pertinent part: “It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly
distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute any obscene material or
any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs
for any thing of pecuniary value.” ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (2007).
2. Williams VI, 478 F.3d at 1318.
3. Williams v. King (Williams V), 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1254 (N.D. Ala. 2006), aff’d sub
nom. Williams VI, 478 F.3d 1316.
4. Id. at 1244–45 (citing Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232
(11th Cir. 2004)). Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI) is the Eleventh Circuit’s third decision in
Appellants’ cause. Williams VI, 478 F.3d at 1318. Initially, Appellants facially challenged the
statute, inviting the district court to recognize a fundamental right to use sexual devices. Williams
v. Pryor (Williams I), 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1260 (N.D. Ala. 1999), rev’d, 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir.
2001). The district court declined to find such a right, id. at 1282–84, and thus applied rational-
basis review. Id. at 1284–93. The district court found that the statute lacked a rational basis and
enjoined the enforcement of the statute. Id. at 1293. 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of the facial fundamental-
rights challenge but reversed the district court’s finding that the statute lacked a rational basis.
Williams v. Pryor (Williams II), 240 F.3d 944, 952–53 (11th Cir. 2001). The Eleventh Circuit
suggested that criminalizing the commercial distribution of sexual devices is rationally related to
Alabama’s interest in public morality. See id. at 952. The Eleventh Circuit remanded the cause for
further consideration of Appellants’ “as-applied fundamental rights challenges.” Id. at 955.
The district court invalidated the statute on remand, this time finding that the statute
unconstitutionally burdened the right of consenting adults privately to use sexual devices. See
Williams v. Pryor (Williams III), 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1307 (N.D. Ala. 2002), rev’d sub nom.
Williams IV, 378 F.3d 1232. The Eleventh Circuit again reversed and remanded the cause, rejecting
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Appellants filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama to enjoin the enforcement of an Alabama statute that prohibits
the commercial distribution of sex toys.  Appellants claimed that the1
statute unconstitutionally burdened their rights to privacy and personal
autonomy.  The district court upheld the statute,  applying a previous2 3
holding of the Eleventh Circuit that the U.S. Constitution did not recognize
a fundamental right to sexual privacy.  The district court concluded that4
1
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the district court’s holding that a fundamental right to sexual privacy existed to trigger strict
scrutiny of the statute. Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1238, 1250.
5. Williams V, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1250.
6. Id. at 1254 (finding that Williams II remains “good law”). The district court wrote, “To
hold that public morality can never serve as a rational basis for legislation . . . would cause a
‘massive disruption of the current social order,’ one this court is not willing to set into motion.” Id.
at 1249–50 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 591 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
7. Williams VI, 478 F.3d at 1318.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. This Comment focuses on substantive, not procedural, due process. See, e.g., Collins v.
City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (observing that substantive due process “protects
individual liberty against ‘certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures
used to implement them’” (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986))).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“There
may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first
ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth.”); see also The Honorable Rosemary Barkett, U.S. Circuit Judge, Dunwody
Distinguished Lecture in Law: Judicial Discretion and Judicious Deliberation (Mar. 23, 2007), in
59 FLA. L. REV. 905, 909–11 (2007) (suggesting that judges are rights-protectors).
11. The U.S. Supreme Court has identified the following as some of the rights protected by
the Due Process Clause: marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); directing the
education and upbringing of one’s children, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923);
marital privacy to use contraception, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965); bodily
integrity, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952); and access to abortion, Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152–54 (1973).
12. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
13. Id. at 721; see also id. at 722–23 (applying the “careful description” step to the asserted
interest).
14. Id. at 721; see also id. at 723–28 (applying the “deeply rooted” step to the asserted
interest).
the statute was based on “concerns over public morality”  and that those5
concerns were rationally related to Alabama’s commercial ban.  On6
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that public morality
supplied a legitimate rational basis for the statute.7
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the
states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.”  The Due Process Clause guarantees not only fair8
procedures but also substantively fair, reasonable legislation that promotes
legitimate governmental objectives.  Accordingly, a court will usually9
uphold legislation that is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
objective but will heighten its scrutiny of legislation that appears to
infringe on certain fundamental rights or liberty interests.10
To determine whether an asserted right or liberty interest is
fundamental,  a court applies the two-step analysis articulated in11
Washington v. Glucksberg.  The court begins by looking at a “careful12
description” of the asserted fundamental interest.  Then the court13
examines whether that interest is “deeply rooted” in the American legal
tradition.14
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15. The statute provides, “A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he
knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(1)
(2006). “Promoting a suicide attempt” is a felony, id. § 9A.36.060(2), punishable by up to five
years’ imprisonment and up to a $10,000 fine, id. § 9A.20.021(1)(c).
16. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722 (quoting Brief of Respondents at 7, Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 708925). The asserted liberty interest was also described as follows:
“‘whether there is a liberty interest in determining the time and manner of one’s death,’ or . . . ‘[i]s
there a right to die?,’” id. (alteration in original) (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79
F.3d 790, 798–99 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d sub nom. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702); whether there is
“a right to ‘control of one’s final days,’ and . . . ‘the liberty to shape death,’” id. (quoting Brief of
Respondents, supra, at 7, 18).
17. Id. at 711–16. 
18. Id. at 711 n.8 (“‘In total, forty-four states, the District of Columbia and two territories
prohibit or condemn assisted suicide.’” (quoting Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 847 (Beezer, J.,
dissenting)); id. (“‘[A] blanket prohibition on assisted suicide . . . is the norm among western
democracies.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney Gen.),
[1993] S.C.R. 519, ¶ 52)).
19. Id. at 735. The Court has acknowledged, however, that “a competent person has a right
to refuse unwanted medical treatment.” O. Carter Snead, Dynamic Complementarity: Terri’s Law
and Separation of Powers Principles in the End-of-Life Context, 57 FLA. L. REV. 53, 71 (2005)
(emphasis added) (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 & n.7 (1990)).
The Cruzan Court explicitly grounded the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment in the
“‘liberty interest’ under the Due Process Clause” and not in “a generalized constitutional right of
privacy.” Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 & n.7; cf. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725 (“The right assumed in
Cruzan, however, was not simply deduced from abstract concepts of personal autonomy. Given the
common-law rule that forced medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition protecting the
decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, our assumption was entirely consistent with this
Nation’s history and constitutional traditions. The decision to commit suicide with the assistance
of another may be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical
treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection.”).
20. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723 (“‘The mere novelty of such a claim is reason enough
to doubt that “substantive due process” sustains it.’” (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303
(1993))).
In Glucksberg, the petitioners claimed that Washington State’s
assisted-suicide ban  violated the “‘liberty to choose how to die.’”  The15 16
Glucksberg Court noted that criminalizing assisted suicide was the norm
not only in the common law, as adopted by the early American colonies,17
but also today among the states and Western democracies.  Thus, the18
Court found that substantive due process did not protect the petitioners’
asserted interest.  In so doing, the Court established that the proponents19
of a newly asserted substantive due process interest must present a strong
case to overcome the traditional presumption against recognizing that
newly asserted interest.20
But just because an asserted right or liberty interest is not deeply rooted
in the tradition does not mean that a court will necessarily uphold a law
that burdens the exercise of that interest. Sometimes a court will invalidate
3
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21. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 110–15 (1977) (contrasting a law’s enactment force, i.e., the formal rule itself,
and a law’s gravitational force, i.e., the law’s persuasiveness to influence future decisions). For
more on Dworkin’s distinction between enactment force and gravitational force, see Robert C.L.
Moffat, The Perils of Positivism or Lon Fuller’s Lesson on Looking at Law: Neither Science nor
Mystery—Merely Method, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 325–29 (1987) (discussing the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
22. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
23. Id. at 562–63. Police were responding “to a reported weapons disturbance . . . . The right
of the police to enter does not seem to have been questioned.” Id.
24. Id. at 563. The statute provided: “A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate
sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a)
(Vernon 2003), invalidated by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. The statute defines “[d]eviate sexual
intercourse” as follows: “(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the
mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person
with an object.” Id. § 21.01(1).
25. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. The Court also granted certiorari to consider two additional
questions: (1) “Whether petitioners’ criminal convictions under the Texas ‘Homosexual Conduct’
law—which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by
different-sex couples—violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the
laws” and (2) whether to overrule Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), which declined
to find a fundamental right to engage in sodomy. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
26. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563–64, 578–79.
27. Id. at 571–72 (“‘[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the
ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.’” (alteration in original) (quoting County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring))). The Lawrence Court
further noted that “[t]he foundations of Bowers have sustained serious erosion from our recent
decisions.” Id. at 576; accord Christopher Wolfe, Moving Beyond Rhetoric, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1065,
1091–92 (2005) (identifying factors that contribute to homosexuality’s emergence as a “new theme
of sexual liberation,” and recognizing that “[p]ublic opinion generally has moved in the direction
of supporting the elimination of legal prohibitions on homosexual activity per se”).
28. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572–73.
a law that is inconsistent with prevailing moral standards.  The U.S.21
Supreme Court did just that in Lawrence v. Texas.22
In Lawrence, police caught the petitioners, two homosexual men,
engaging in sodomy in their apartment.  The petitioners were convicted23
of violating Texas’s ban on homosexual sodomy.  They argued on appeal24
that their “convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home
violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”25
After a Texas appellate court rejected the petitioners’ arguments, the
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and invalidated the statute.  The26
Court recognized the increasing support among the states for the public
policy that “liberty” extends to decision-making by adults about their
private sex lives.  To that end, the Court documented the reduction over27
the latter half of the twentieth century in the number of states that
maintained or enforced anti-sodomy statutes.28
4
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29. Id. at 575.
30. Id. at 578.
31. Id. at 567.
32. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution
of Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2005) (“[F]ew constitutional scholars think
the narrowest or the broadest reading of Lawrence is correct.”); Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation
and the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1528, 1531–32, 1534–35 (2004);
Lawrence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1921–25 (2004).
33. See Robert C.L. Moffat, Judicial Decision as Paradigm: Case Studies of Morality and
Law in Interaction, 37 FLA. L. REV. 297, 324–35 (1985) (discussing paradigm theory in judicial
decision-making).
34. See Eskridge, supra note 32, at 1012 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)). Justice Scalia stated that “[t]oday’s opinion is the product of a Court, which is the
product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda,
by which I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the
moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
35. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
36. Eskridge, supra note 32, at 1012 (citing Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817). 
37. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 806–07. The statute provides: “No person eligible to adopt under this
statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.” FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2007). The Lofton court
noted that the “Florida courts have defined the term ‘homosexual’ as being ‘limited to applicants
who are known to engage in current, voluntary homosexual activity,’ thus drawing ‘a distinction
between homosexual orientation and homosexual activity.’” Lofton, 358 F.3d at 807 (quoting State
Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1215 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), aff’d in
relevant part, quashed in part, 656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995)).
38. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 809. The appellants also claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause prohibits Florida from “categorically prohibiting only homosexual persons
from adopting children.” Id. The court rejected this claim because the appellants failed to identify
In light of the waning support for anti-sodomy laws, the Lawrence
Court determined that statutes like Texas’s demeaned homosexuals.  The29
Court found no legitimate state interest that could justify intruding into an
individual’s private life.  Therefore, the Court concluded that the Due30
Process Clause’s protection of liberty extended to the petitioners’ right to
participate in consensual sexual conduct in the privacy of their home.31
Lawrence’s scope remains debated because the Court justified its
holding on the broad notion of liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment and did not apply Glucksberg’s fundamental-rights analysis.32
Consequently, some read Lawrence broadly, interpreting it as extending
beyond the sodomy context and representing a paradigm shift  in33
constitutional law.  Others, including the Eleventh Circuit, read Lawrence34
narrowly, as Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family
Services  illustrates.35 36
In Lofton, the appellants challenged a Florida statute that prohibited
adoption by practicing homosexuals.  The appellants claimed that the37
statute violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights to familial
privacy, intimacy, and integrity.  They further claimed that because38
5
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a fundamental right disturbed by the statute. Id. at 818 (“Unless the challenged classification
burdens a fundamental right or targets a suspect class, the Equal Protection Clause requires only
that the classification be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. As we have explained,
Florida’s statute burdens no fundamental rights.” (citation omitted)).
39. Id. at 809.
40. Id. at 812 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)).
41. See id. at 817 (“Hence, we conclude that the Lawrence decision cannot be extrapolated
to create a right to adopt for homosexual persons.”).
42. Id. at 813–14.
43. Id. (“‘The very fact that the relationship before us is a creature of state law, as well as the
fact that it has never been recognized as equivalent to either the natural family or the adoptive
family by any court, demonstrates that it is not a protected liberty interest, but an interest limited
by the very laws [that] create it.’” (quoting Drummond v. Fulton County Dep’t of Family &
Children’s Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977))).
44. Id. at 815–16 (“The effect of [Lawrence] was to establish a greater respect than
previously existed in the law for the right of consenting adults to engage in private sexual conduct.
Nowhere, however, did the Court characterize this right as ‘fundamental.’” (citation omitted)).
45. Id. at 816–17.
46. Id. at 816 n.13.
47. Id. at 817 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)) (emphasis added).
48. See id. at 815–17.
Lawrence recognized private sexual intimacy as a fundamental right, the
Florida statute impermissibly burdened their exercise of that right.39
Although recognizing that parents have the fundamental right to make
decisions about “‘the care, custody, and control of their children,’”  the40
Lofton court rejected the appellants’ claims.  The court noted that, unlike41
the natural family, the foster family is a relationship based in state law, and
the privileges associated with that relationship are necessarily limited by
state law.  Because the appellants had established a foster family, the42
court concluded that the statute did not violate the appellants’ asserted
fundamental rights.43
In so concluding, the Lofton court read Lawrence narrowly.  To44
support its narrow reading, the court noted that Glucksberg’s two-step
fundamental-rights analysis was missing in Lawrence.  The Lofton court45
read Lawrence as suggesting that the right to engage in private sexual
conduct comes from the Due Process Clause’s broad concept of liberty
and from various fundamental rights “closely related to sexual intimacy.”46
The court also suggested that Lawrence was decided under rational-basis
review because the Lawrence Court found that the Texas statute “‘furthers
no legitimate state interest [that] can justify its intrusion into the personal
and private life of the individual.’”  Accordingly, the Lofton court47
concluded that Florida’s ban on adoption by homosexuals could not
burden the appellants’ asserted right to private sexual intimacy because
that asserted right did not exist.48
6
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49. See id. at 817–19.
50. Id. at 819 n.17.
51. Id. Indeed, the appellees argued that the statute was rationally related to the state’s
legitimate “interest in promoting public morality both in the context of child rearing and in the
context of determining which types of households should be accorded legal recognition as families.
The appellants respond[ed] that public morality cannot serve as a legitimate state interest.” Id.
52. Id.
53. Eskridge suggests that one could “logically and responsibly argue[] from the majority and
concurring opinions” that “Lawrence entail[ed] a massive shift . . . [in] protecting any and all
private sexual activities.” Eskridge, supra note 32, at 1012.
54. Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir. 2007).
55. Id. at 1322.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1322–23.
58. Id. at 1322 (“The present case . . . does not involve public conduct . . . .” (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003))).
59. Id. (“As the majority in Williams IV so colorfully put it: ‘There is nothing “private” or
“consensual” about the advertising and sale of a dildo.’” (quoting Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala.
(Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1237 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004))).
60. The statute specifically prohibits the distribution “for any thing of pecuniary value.” ALA.
CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (2007) (emphasis added).
61. Williams VI, 478 F.3d at 1322. The court would have been more likely to invalidate the
statute if the statute prohibited people from simply using sex toys. See Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
The Lofton court then scrutinized the statute under rational-basis
review.  It found a sufficient rational basis in Florida’s interest in49
encouraging married couples to adopt.  In so doing, the court did not50
reach the question whether public morality could supply a rational basis
for the statute.  Nevertheless, the Lofton court suggested through dicta51
that public morality could provide a legitimate rational basis even after
Lawrence.  52
Applying Lofton’s narrow reading of Lawrence,  the Eleventh Circuit53
limited Lawrence’s potential impact in Williams v. Morgan.  Appellants54
argued that Alabama’s ban on the commercial distribution of sex toys, like
the invalidated Texas statute, impermissibly intruded on individual
decision-making about sexuality.  Appellants further argued that their55
cause could not be distinguished from Lawrence and, therefore, public
morality could not supply a rational basis for the Alabama statute.56
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with Appellants and distinguished the
two cases.  The Texas statute in Lawrence criminalized private sexual57
activity,  while the Alabama statute prohibited public, commercial58
activity.  The Alabama statute specifically banned only the sale,  not the59 60
“use” or “the gratuitous distribution of,” sex toys.61
7
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62. Williams VI likely would not have been before the Eleventh Circuit if the U.S. Supreme
Court had not decided Lawrence in 2003. In 2001, the Eleventh Circuit held in Williams II that “[a]
statute banning the commercial distribution of sexual devices is rationally related to” the state’s
interest in safeguarding public morality. Williams v. Pryor (Williams II), 240 F.3d 944, 949 (11th
Cir. 2001). The law-of-the-case doctrine binds appellate courts to “the findings of fact and
conclusions of law . . . in all subsequent proceedings in the same case in the trial court or on a later
appeal.” This That & The Other Gift & Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb County, 439 F.3d 1275, 1283 (11th
Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Judge Barkett found the law-of-the-case doctrine inapplicable to Williams
II because “Williams II . . . rel[ied] on the now defunct Bowers [decision] to conclude that public
morality provides a legitimate state interest . . . . Obviously now that Bowers has been overruled
[by Lawrence], this proposition is no longer good law and we must, accordingly, revisit our holding
in Williams II.” Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1259 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
63. Williams VI, 478 F.3d at 1323.
64. See id. at 1322–23.
65. Id. at 1322 (emphasis in original).
66. Id. at 1324 (“‘This Court does not invalidate bad or foolish policies, only unconstitutional
ones . . . .’” (quoting Williams II, 240 F.3d at 952)).
67. See Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 819 n.17
(11th Cir. 2004).
68. See Williams VI, 478 F.3d at 1323.
69. Id.; see also Lofton, 358 F.3d at 815–17 (“We conclude that it is a strained and ultimately
incorrect reading of Lawrence to interpret it to announce a new fundamental right.”).
70. See Williams VI, 478 F.3d at 1322 (“This statute targets commerce in sexual devices, an
inherently public activity, whether it occurs on a street corner, in a shopping mall, or in a living
room. . . . [P]laintiffs here continue to possess and use such devices.”).
After distinguishing Lawrence, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed  that62
public morality remained a legitimate rational basis for the Alabama
statute.  The court declined to read Lawrence as completely eliminating63
public morality as a legitimate government interest.  As the court64
implicitly recognized, Lawrence might have, to some extent, eroded public
morality as a legitimate interest but only for laws that prohibit “both
private and non-commercial” sexual conduct.  Because the Alabama65
statute did not prohibit the private, non-commercial use of sex toys, the
court concluded that no constitutional basis existed to invalidate the
statute.66
The Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion is, perhaps, unsurprising. The
court’s own precedent established the legal basis for the conclusion.  The67
case presented the court with an opportunity to apply the dicta from Lofton
stating that Lawrence did not eliminate public morality from supplying a
legitimate rational basis.  Because the Lofton court refused to find that68
Lawrence created a fundamental right to sexual privacy,  the Eleventh69
Circuit did not have to determine whether the Alabama statute
unconstitutionally burdened sex toy users in exercising that asserted
interest.70
8
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71. Id. at 1322–23.
72. Id. at 1323; see also Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819 n.17 (“We do note, however, the Supreme
Court’s conclusion that there is not only a legitimate interest, but ‘a substantial government interest
in protecting order and morality,’ and its observations that ‘[i]n a democratic society legislatures,
not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people.’”
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569
(1991), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (plurality opinion))).
73. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1239–44 (11th Cir.
2004).
74. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (“[W]e have required in
substantive-due-process cases a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.”).
75. Williams VI, 478 F.3d at 1322.
76. Id. at 1322 n.6 (quoting Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1242). The Eleventh Circuit “connected
the sale of sexual devices with their use [in Williams IV] only in the limited context of framing the
scope of the liberty interest at stake under the fundamental rights analysis of . . . Glucksberg.” Id.
(citing Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1242).
77. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (“[W]e have regularly observed that the Due Process
Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ . . . .” (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 531
U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion))).
78. Williams VI, 478 F.3d at 1322 (“‘[T]he State does not lose its power to regulate
commercial activity deemed harmful to the public . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978))).
79. Id. at 1322–23.
80. Id. at 1323 (“By upholding the statute, we do not endorse the judgment of the Alabama
legislature.”).
81. See id. at 1321–23.
82. Robert C.L. Moffat, “Not the Law’s Business:” The Politics of Tolerance and the
In applying the dicta from Lofton, the Eleventh Circuit scrutinized the
statute under rational-basis review.  Specifically, the court applied to its71
holding the dicta in Lofton that identified U.S. Supreme Court precedent
that maintains public morality as a legitimate rational basis for laws
impacting public conduct.  But even if the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the72
statute under Glucksberg’s two-step analysis, as had been done in a
previous stage of the litigation,  the court would still likely have found73
that Lawrence did not render the Alabama statute unconstitutional.
Carefully described,  the Alabama statute prohibits the “commercial”74
distribution of sex toys.  Thus, the statute merely makes it more75
inconvenient to access sex toys. Although restrictions on access to sex toys
arguably amount “‘to restrictions on [private] use,’”  the Glucksberg76
analysis would still fail  because the states have traditionally had the77
authority to regulate public (commercial) activity perceived as harmful.78
The Eleventh Circuit preserved that traditional state authority by declining
to apply Lawrence’s rationale to public activity.79
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit acted cautiously. Although signaling
its own disapproval of the statute  and recognizing that Lawrence80
embodied a “live and let be” rationale for sexual privacy,  the court81
avoided a paradigm shift for which our society appears not yet prepared.82
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Enforcement of Morality, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1097, 1128–29 (2005) (suggesting that the outcome in
Lawrence was unsurprising but that the “paradigm shift [to the legal recognition of gay marriage]
has not yet been put in place”).
83. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 175 (1976).
84. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
134 (2005) (“[The Constitution] is a document that trusts people to solve [the problems of a
community for] themselves. And it creates a framework for a government that will help them do
so. That framework foresees democratically determined solutions, protective of the individual’s
basic liberties.”).
85. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
86. Williams v. King, 128 S. Ct. 77 (2007).
87. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, No. 06-51067, 2008 WL 383034, at *6 (5th Cir. Feb.
12, 2008).
88. Id. at *1. Under the statute, “[a] person commits an offense if, knowing its content and
character, he wholesale promotes or possesses with intent to wholesale promote any obscene
material or obscene device.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.23(a) (Vernon 2003), invalidated by
Reliable Consultants, 2008 WL 383034, at *6. “‘Wholesale promote’ means to manufacture, issue,
sell, provide, mail, deliver, transfer, transmit, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present,
exhibit, or advertise, or to offer or agree to do the same for purpose of resale.” Id. § 43.21(a)(6).
The statute classified sex toys as “obscene device[s].” Id. § 43.21(a)(7).
89. Reliable Consultants, 2008 WL 383034, at *1. A person commits a misdemeanor if he
knowingly “promotes or possesses with intent to promote any obscene material or obscene device.”
§ 43.23(c)(1). “‘Promote’ means to manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver,
transfer, transmit, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit, or advertise, or to
offer or agree to do the same.” Id. § 43.21(a)(5) (emphasis added).
90. Reliable Consultants, 2008 WL 383034, at *4–5 & n.33.
91. Id. at *4.
It would have been anomalous for the court to find that public morality
could no longer serve as a legitimate rational basis for regulating
commerce, an inherently non-private activity.  By declining to heighten83
its scrutiny of the Alabama statute, the Eleventh Circuit has sustained the
role of the people of Alabama  to decide whether their state law is84
“uncommonly silly.”85
EPILOGUE
The U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari in
Williams v. Morgan.  Nonetheless, the Court may soon be asked to review86
another sex toy statute. The Fifth Circuit recently invalidated, in a 2–1
decision, a Texas statute similar to Alabama’s.  Like the Alabama statute,87
the Texas statute outlawed the commercial distribution of sex toys.  But88
unlike the Alabama statute, the Texas statute also prohibited individuals
from lending or giving away sex toys to others.89
In invalidating the Texas statute, the Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected the
Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of Lawrence.  Without articulating a90
position in the debate about whether Lawrence requires heightened
scrutiny of the statute,  the Fifth Circuit noted that the Lawrence Court91
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92. Id. at *3 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)).
93. Id. at *4. The statute did not prohibit the use or possession of sex toys. Id. at *1. As the
Fifth Circuit noted, the restriction against lending or giving away sex toys undercut Texas’s
argument that the statute affected only public conduct. Id. at *4.
94. Id. at *5 & n.33.
95. Id. at *5. The court emphasized that its holding does not “impl[y] that public morality can
never be a constitutional justification for a law.” Id. at *5 n.36.
96. Id. at *5.
97. See Eskridge, supra note 32, at 1012.
98. Id.
99. The U.S. Supreme Court considers “every subsidiary question fairly included” in the
questions expressly articulated in petitions for writ of certiorari. SUP. CT. R. 14(1)(a). Reviewing
the Fifth Circuit’s decision would also provide an opportunity for the Court to clarify when a state
regulation is unconstitutional because it “substantially limit[s] access to the means of effectuating”
constitutionally protected individual decision-making. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431
U.S. 678, 688 (1977) (emphasis added). As the Carey Court noted:
A total prohibition against sale of contraceptives, for example, would intrude upon
individual decisions in matters of procreation and contraception as harshly as a
direct ban on their use. Indeed, in practice, a prohibition against all sales, since
more easily and less offensively enforced, might have an even more devastating
effect upon the freedom to choose contraception.
Id. at 687–88. The Carey Court did not, however, “definitively answer[] the difficult question
recognized “a right to be free from governmental intrusion regarding ‘the
most private human conduct, sexual behavior.’”  The Fifth Circuit found92
that the Texas statute impermissibly burdened that right because the statute
prohibited individuals from buying, lending, or giving away sex toys for
their own private use.  93
The Fifth Circuit also concluded, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit, that
public morality could not serve as a rational basis for the sex toy statute
after Lawrence.  According to the Fifth Circuit, if public morality is an94
insufficient basis for regulating private sexual conduct, then public
morality is similarly not a rational basis for a ban on promoting sex toys,
“which also regulates private sexual intimacy.”  The court determined that95
the ban on promoting sex toys was like the invalidated statute in Lawrence
to the extent that Texas tried in both cases to regulate certain forms of
private sexual conduct simply because it was morally opposed to those
forms of conduct.96
The recent circuit split about the extent to which the states may
regulate the distribution of sex toys confirms that, without clarification
from the U.S. Supreme Court, Lawrence will likely continue to yield
inconsistent outcomes.  As these sex toy cases show, Lawrence will also97
likely continue to be applied to controversies beyond homosexual
sodomy.  The Fifth Circuit’s recent decision provides the U.S. Supreme98
Court an opportunity to resolve the ongoing debate about Lawrence’s
scope.  Perhaps the case for reviewing the decision is “compelling”99 100
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whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating (private consensual
sexual) behavior among adults.” Id. at 689 n.5. Although the Fifth Circuit noted that the Texas
statute, unlike the Alabama statute, prohibited the gratuitous transfer of sex toys, Reliable
Consultants, 2008 WL 383034, at *4, the court did not, and arguably could not, address whether
that restriction “substantially limit[ed]” a constitutionally protected subject of individual decision-
making. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 688. An answer to that question seems to turn on whether Lawrence
established a fundamental right.
100. “A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.” SUP. CT.
R. 10.
101. The U.S. Supreme Court may grant a writ of certiorari when “a United States court of
appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals
on the same important matter.” SUP. CT. R. 10(a).
102. Reliable Consultants, 2008 WL 383034, at *4–5 & n.33.
because two circuits are now “in conflict”  over how Lawrence, an101
important precedent, should be applied.  Whatever becomes of the circuit102
split on the distribution of sex toys, the U.S. Supreme Court should take
an opportunity in the near future to promote uniformity by clarifying
Lawrence.
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